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THE FISCAL COMPACT, THE “GOLDEN 
RULE,” AND THE PARADOX OF EUROPEAN 
FEDERALISM 
Federico Fabbrini* 
Abstract: This Article analyzes the central provision of the recently en-
acted Fiscal Compact, which directs member states of the European Un-
ion (EU) to incorporate into their constitutions a “golden rule” —that is, 
a requirement that yearly budgets be balanced. The purpose of the Arti-
cle is to examine—by surveying the introduction of these pervasive budg-
etary constraints in four selected EU member states (Germany, France, 
Italy and Spain)—the institutional implications that the “golden rule” has 
on the role of the political and judicial branches, both in the states and in 
the EU as a whole. The Article argues that, while the domestic effects of 
the “golden rule” are likely to vary from one state to another, the Fiscal 
Compact systematically enhances the powers of the EU institutions to di-
rect and police the budgetary policies of EU member states, thus increas-
ing centralization in the EU architecture of economic governance. The 
Article then contrasts this development with the federal experience of the 
United States. A comparative perspective sheds light on the fact that, 
while most U.S. states are also endowed with constitutional “golden 
rules,” the federal government never played a role in their adoption and 
is barred from interfering with the budgetary processes of the states. In 
conclusion, the Article suggests that an unexpected paradox emerges in 
the new constitutional architecture of the EU: Although in crafting the 
institutional response to the Euro-zone crisis state governments have re-
peatedly discarded a U.S.-like federal model as being too centralized and 
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centripetal for the EU, they have ended up establishing a regime that is 
much less respectful of state sovereignty than the U.S. federal system. 
Introduction 
 On March 2, 2012, twenty-five out of twenty-seven member states 
of the European Union (EU) agreed to sign in Brussels the Treaty on 
the Stability, Coordination, and Governance in the Economic and 
Monetary Union (TSCG).1 This treaty, generally referred to as the Fis-
cal Compact, was adopted under the pressures of financial markets, 
which, since 2008, have been threatening several countries of the Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union (EMU) with the spectre of sovereign de-
fault.2 In this context, the treaty represents the latest, and allegedly 
conclusive, attempt to provide a satisfactory answer to the Euro-zone 
crisis.3 The Fiscal Compact raises a number of new issues in the fields of 
international law, EU law, and comparative constitutional law.4 Techni-
cally drafted as an international treaty, but functionally connected to 
the EU legal order, the Fiscal Compact pursues the goal of strengthen-
ing budgetary discipline in the member states of the Euro-zone.5 The 
enactment of the Fiscal Compact reflects the understanding that the 
existence of a common supranational currency (the Euro), coupled 
with a no-bail-out clause in Article 125 of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the EU (TFEU), requires tighter fiscal constraints in the Euro-zone 
member states.6 In particular, this Article focuses on the obligation the 
                                                                                                                      
 
1 See Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary 
Union pmbl., art. 16, Mar. 2, 2012, http://european-council.europa.eu/eurozone-govern 
ance/ treaty-on-stability [hereinafter TSCG]. 
2 See Loïc Azoulai et al., Another Legal Monster? An EUI Debate on the Fiscal Compact Treaty 1–
3, 20 (Eur. Univ. Inst. Dep’t of Law, Working Paper No. 2012/9, 2012), available at http:// 
cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/21496/LAW_2012_09_Kocharov_ed.pdf?sequence= 
1. 
3 See id. at 20, 24–31. See generally Matthias Ruffert, The European Debt Crisis and European 
Union Law, 48 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 1777 (2011) (analyzing prior normative responses to 
the Euro crisis). 
4 See generally Azoulai, supra note 2 (assessing interplay between EU law and the Fiscal 
Compact). 
5 TSCG, supra note 1, pmbl. The Fiscal Compact has been signed by all seventeen 
member states of the Euro-zone. European Union Committee, The Euro Area Crisis, 
2012, H.L. 260, ¶ 75 [hereinafter The Euro Area Crisis]. Another eight EU member 
states that do not currently use the Euro have also joined the Fiscal Compact. Id. The 
United Kingdom (UK) and the Czech Republic have refused to join the Compact. See id. 
6 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 125, 
Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 47, 99 [hereinafter TFEU]; see Azoulai, supra note 2, at 15–17. 
Note that in the Article I will use the expressions EMU and Euro-zone interchangeably. Ac-
cording to Article 119 TFEU, the member states agree to coordinate their economic policies 
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Fiscal Compact imposes on signatory states to enact the so-called “gold-
en rule” —a requirement that annual government budgets be bal-
anced—in state constitutions.7 This requirement, which is unprece-
dented in the history of European integration, significantly increases 
the involvement of supranational institutions in the fiscal sovereignty of 
the states and is likely to affect the vertical balance of powers between 
the states and the EU.8 
 This Article examines the “golden rule” articulated in the Fiscal 
Compact by tracing its origin in German constitutional law and assess-
ing the institutional challenges that its adoption raises in four selected 
EU member states (Germany, France, Italy, and Spain) and at the EU 
level. The developments taking place in the EMU are then compared 
to the experience of the United States in the field of fiscal federalism. 
The EMU and the United States appear to share several common struc-
tural features. The United States also established a single federal cur-
rency among its federated states through a long and difficult process.9 
Moreover, the U.S. federal government is barred from bailing out de-
faulting states, and most U.S. states have budgetary constraints in their 
constitutions prohibiting governments from running their budget at a 
deficit.10 Yet, in the United States, the enactment of “golden rules” at 
                                                                                                                      
and create a single monetary union (the EMU) whose currency is the Euro (hence the ex-
pression “Euro-zone”). TFEU art. 119. Participation in the EMU is an obligation for all EU 
member states. See id. arts. 119–121. However, at the moment, two states have obtained a 
specific opt-out from the single currency, while eight states do not yet fulfill the technical 
criteria to become part of the single currency. Who can Join and When?, Eur. Commission, 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/euro/adoption/who_can_join/index_en.htm (last 
updated July 17, 2012). See generally Pier Carlo Padoan, EMU as an Evolutionary Process, in 
Governing the World’s Money 105 (David M. Andrews et al. eds., 2002) (describing the 
process of integration of the EMU and the resultant benefits). 
7 Azoulai, supra note 2, at 4–5. Arguably, this provision represents one of the only true 
legal novelties introduced by the Fiscal Compact. See id. A few months before the adoption 
of the Fiscal Compact, in fact, EU institutions adopted the so-called “six pack,” namely a 
package of five regulations and one directive aimed at strengthening the surveillance of 
state budgetary policies. See infra note 17. It appears that, with the exception of the “gold-
en rule” and a few other clauses, the Fiscal Compact provisions simply duplicate EU sec-
ondary legislation in the form of an international treaty. See Editorial Comments, Some 
Thoughts Concerning the Draft Treaty on a Reinforced Economic Union, 49 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 
1, 5 n.12 (2012). 
8 See Editorial Comments, supra note 7, at 9–11. See generally Robert P. Inman & Daniel 
L. Rubinfeld, The EMU and Fiscal Policy in the New European Community: An Issue for Economic 
Federalism, 14 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 147 (1994) (assessing the EMU’s impact on member 
states’ autonomy in fiscal policy). 
9 Kathleen R. McNamara, State Building, the Territorialisation of Money, and the Creation of the 
American Single Currency, in Governing the World’s Money, supra note 6, at 128, 138–39. 
10 James D. Savage, Balanced Budgets and American Politics 79–80, 117–18 (1988). 
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the state constitutional level was never required by federal law, but 
rather emerged as an autonomous decision of the states to ensure their 
access to the financial market.11 In light of the comparison with the 
United States, the Article will therefore argue that an unexpected par-
adox emerges in the new constitutional architecture of the Euro-zone: 
Although, in reforming the EMU, state governments have consistently 
discarded the federal model as being too centralized and centripetal 
for Europe, they have ended up establishing a regime that is much less 
respectful of state sovereignty than the U.S. federal one. 
 The Article will be structured as follows. In Part I, I examine the 
Fiscal Compact and detail its core requirement that states adopt a bal-
anced-budget amendment in their constitutions. In Part II, I analyze 
the “golden rule” at the state level in Europe. Here, on the one hand, I 
explain how the provisions of the Fiscal Compact draw from German 
constitutional law and, on the other hand, I assess whether the constitu-
tional reforms that have recently been concluded in Spain and Italy, 
and started in France, satisfy the requirement of the Fiscal Compact. 
Part III considers the institutional implications of the introduction of 
the “golden rule,” both for state political and judicial branches, and for 
the EU bodies charged with enforcing them. Part IV then expands the 
analysis to the experience of the United States, surveying the U.S. 
model of fiscal federalism and explaining how, in the United States, the 
federal government exercises limited powers over the budgetary poli-
cies of the states. Part V finally contrasts the U.S. experience with the 
current European one and develops the argument that the EU is be-
coming more centralized than the United States in terms of fiscal rules. 
As it will be maintained, the paradox of European constitutionalism 
may be that, while the governments of the EU member states systemati-
cally discard a federal arrangement for the EMU as disrespectful of 
state sovereignty, the very sovereignty of the states would be better off 
under a federal system like that of the United States, rather than under 
the regime the Fiscal Compact is currently creating. 
I. The “Golden Rule” in the Fiscal Compact 
 The overall objective of the Fiscal Compact, as stated in the pream-
ble, is to re-affirm “the need for governments to maintain sound and 
sustainable public finances and to prevent a general government deficit 
[from] becoming excessive . . . [in order] to safeguard the stability of 
                                                                                                                      
11 Erik Wibbels, Bailouts, Budget Constraints and Leviathans: Comparative Federalism and 
Lessons from the Early United States, 36 Comp. Pol. Stud. 475, 498 (2003). 
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the euro area as a whole.”12 The objective of ensuring the sustainability 
of state budgets was already enshrined in the Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP) originally enacted in two Council regulations in 1997,13 and cur-
rently attached as Protocol 12 to the TFEU,14 which requires the mem-
ber states of the EMU to maintain their public deficit below the yearly 
ratio of 3% of the GDP and the total public debt below 60% of the 
GDP.15 The weaknesses of the enforcement mechanisms of the SGP, 
however, ensured widespread non-compliance by EMU countries with 
the SGP debt and deficit criteria.16 Failure to abide by the SGP budget-
ary criteria was allegedly one of the reasons for the outburst of the fi-
nancial crisis that has afflicted the Euro-zone throughout the last four 
years.17 As a response to this state of affairs, the Fiscal Compact moves 
one step further than the SGP and “requires,” in order to ensure fiscal 
sustainability, “the introduction [at the state level] of specific rules, in-
cluding a ‘balanced budget rule’ and an automatic mechanism to take 
corrective action.”18 
                                                                                                                      
12 TSCG, supra note 1, pmbl. (third recital). 
13 See Council Regulation 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the Strengthening of the Surveil-
lance of Budgetary Positions and the Surveillance and Coordination of Economic Policies, 
pmbl., 1997 O.J. (L 209) 1, 1 (second recital); Council Regulation 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 
on Speeding Up and Clarifying the Implementation of the Excessive Deficit Procedure, 
pmbl., 1997 O.J. (L 209) 6, 6 (third recital). 
14 See Protocol No. 12 on the Excessive Debt Procedure pmbl., May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. 
(C 115) 279 [hereinafter Protocol No. 12]. 
15 See TFEU art 126(2); Protocol No. 12, supra note 14, art. 1. 
16 See Stefan Collignon, The End of the Stability and Growth Pact?, 1 Int’l Econ. & Econ. 
Pol’y 15, 16 (2004). 
17 The enforcement mechanisms of the SGP were strengthened by the enactment of 
the so-called “six pack,” a package of five regulations and one directive, in November 2011. 
See Regulation 1173/2011, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 Novem-
ber 2011 on the Effective Enforcement of Budgetary Surveillance in the Euro Area, 2011 
O.J. (L 306) 1, 1; Regulation 1174/2011, of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 16 November 2011 on Enforcement Measures to Correct Excessive Macroeconomic 
Imbalances in the Euro Area, 2011 O.J. (L 306) 8, 8; Regulation 1175/2011, of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 Amending Council Regulation 
(EC) No 1466/97 on the Strengthening of the Surveillance of Budgetary Positions and the 
Surveillance and Coordination of Economic Policies, 2011 O.J. (L 306) 12, 12; Regulation 
1176/2011, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the 
Prevention and Correction of Macroeconomic Imbalances, 2011 O.J. (L 306) 25, 25; 
Council Regulation 1177/2011, of 8 November 2011 amending Regulation (EC) No 
1467/97 on Speeding Up and Clarifying the Implementation of the Excessive Deficit Pro-
cedure, 2011 O.J. (L 306) 33, 33; Council Directive 2011/85/EU of 8 November 2011 on 
Requirements for Budgetary Frameworks of the Member States, 2011 O.J. (L 306) 41, 41; 
see also LB & JHR, Editorial, The Fiscal Compact and the European Constitutions: “Europe Speak-
ing German,” 8 Eur. Const. L. Rev. 1, 1 (2012). 
18 TSCG, supra note 1, pmbl. (third recital). 
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 The core provision of the Fiscal Compact, Article 3 introduces an 
obligation for the Contracting Parties to respect the “golden rule” of a 
balanced budget in every fiscal year.19 Article 3(1)(a) codifies the gen-
eral rule by stating that “the budgetary position of the general govern-
ment of a Contracting Party shall be balanced or in surplus.”20 This 
rule is further specified by Article 3(1)(b), which states that the rule 
shall be deemed to be respected if the “annual structural balance of the 
general government” (to be intended as “the annual cyclically-adjusted 
balance net of one-off and temporary measures”21) is “with a lower 
limit of a structural deficit of 0.5% of [GDP] at market prices.”22 The 
European Commission is empowered to indicate country-specific ob-
jectives to ensure a sustainable convergence path toward this stan-
dard.23 Article 3(1)(c) then introduces an exception to the “golden 
rule,” stating that “the Contracting Parties may temporarily deviate 
from [the rule] only in exceptional circumstances,” defined in Article 
3(3)(b) as “an unusual event outside the control of the Contracting 
Party concerned which has a major impact on the financial position of 
the general government or to periods of severe economic downturn.”24 
Finally, Article 3(1)(e) sets up corrective mechanisms to be automati-
cally triggered “in the event of significant observed deviations from the 
medium-term objective or the adjustment path towards it.”25 
                                                                                                                     
 The Article 3 “golden rule” will be, upon ratification, binding for 
the 25 signatory parties as an obligation deriving from international 
law.26 Nevertheless, the Fiscal Compact goes further than traditional 
international law and, with a rather unconventional step, requires the 
Contracting Parties to incorporate the “golden rule” in the domestic 
legal system with a specific source of law: constitutional law or its equiv-
alent.27 According to Article 3(2), in fact: 
 
19 See id. art. 3; Azoulai, supra note 2, at 4–5, 24. 
20 TSCG, supra note 1, art. 3(1)(a). 
21 Id. art. 3(3)(a). 
22 Id. art. 3(1)(b). 
23 See id. 
24 Id. art. 3(1)(c), (3)(b). 
25 Id. art. 3(1)(e). 
26 See Azoulai, supra note 2, at 12. Although functionally connected to EU law, the Fis-
cal Compact does not seem to enjoy the supremacy and direct effect of EU law. See generally 
Bruno de Witte, Direct Effect, Supremacy and the Nature of the Legal Order, in The Evolution 
of EU Law 177 (Paul Craig & Gráinne de Búrca eds., 1999) (explaining the legal status of 
EU law). 
27 See Azoulai, supra note 2, at 12–13. 
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The rules set out in paragraph 1 shall take effect in the na-
tional law of the Contracting Parties at the latest one year af-
ter the entry into force of this Treaty through provisions of 
binding force and permanent character, preferably constitu-
tional, or otherwise guaranteed to be fully respected and ad-
hered to throughout the national budgetary processes. The 
Contracting Parties shall put in place at national level the cor-
rection mechanism referred to in paragraph 1(e) on the basis 
of common principles to be proposed by the European 
Commission . . . .28 
The Fiscal Compact, hence, requires states to enact the “golden rule” 
in the state constitutions or—where this would be substantially impos-
sible due to difficulties in amending a constitution—in special domestic 
sources of law that are hierarchically superior to ordinary acts of par-
liament and that can work as benchmarks for the constitutional review 
of budgetary laws.29 
 To ensure that the Contracting Parties comply with the obligation to 
adopt the “golden rule” at the constitutional—or quasi-constitutional— 
level in their domestic legal systems, the Fiscal Compact sets up a mech-
anism of judicial enforcement centered on the EU Court of Justice 
(ECJ).30 According to Article 8: 
The European Commission is invited to present in due time 
to the Contracting Parties a report on the provisions adopted 
by each of them in compliance with Article 3(2). If the Euro-
pean Commission, after having given the Contracting Party 
concerned the opportunity to submit its observations, con-
cludes in its report that such Contracting Party has failed to 
comply with Article 3(2), the matter will be brought to the 
[ECJ] by one or more Contracting Parties. Where a Contract-
ing Party considers, independently of the Commission’s re-
                                                                                                                      
28 See TSCG, supra note 1, art. 3(2). 
29 See LB & JHR, supra note 17, at 3 (explaining how constitutional amendments may 
be adopted only through difficult and time-consuming processes in the Netherland, Bel-
gium and Denmark). 
30 TSCG, supra note 1, art. 8. The possibility of employing the ECJ, an EU institution, 
in the context of the Fiscal Compact, which is technically an international treaty adopted 
by 25 EU member states outside the framework of the EU, is supported by Article 273 
TFEU, which allows the ECJ to “have jurisdiction in any dispute between Member States 
which relates to the subject matter of the Treaties if the dispute is submitted to it under a 
special agreement between the parties.” TFEU art. 273; see TSCG, supra note 1, art. 8(3); 
Editorial Comments, supra note 7, at 8. 
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port, that another Contracting Party has failed to comply with 
Article 3(2), it may also bring the matter to the [ECJ]. In both 
cases, the judgment of the [ECJ] shall be binding on the par-
ties to the proceedings, which shall take the necessary meas-
ures to comply with the judgment within a period to be de-
cided by the [ECJ].31 
If a party does not comply with the first decision of the ECJ, then a sec-
ond case can be brought before the ECJ which may impose on the dis-
obedient state “a lump sum or a penalty payment appropriate in the 
circumstances and that shall not exceed 0.1% of its [GDP].”32 More-
over, as clarified in the preamble of the Fiscal Compact, the possibility 
for EMU countries to receive financial assistance under the new Euro-
pean Stability Mechanism (ESM) will be conditional “as soon as the 
transposition period referred to in Article 3(2) of [the Fiscal Compact] 
has expired, on compliance with the requirements of that Article.”33 
 The Fiscal Compact, in conclusion, establishes a pervasive legal 
regime to tighten the budgetary policies of the Contracting Parties, 
with the goal of ensuring fiscal discipline in the member states as a pre-
condition for financial stability in the entire Euro-zone.34 First, the Fis-
cal Compact provides a very detailed and technical “golden rule,” 
which defines in strict mathematical terms the yearly structural deficit 
permitted in every member state and specifies conditions for disre-
specting the rule, as well as automatic mechanisms to ensure compli-
ance.35 Second, the Fiscal Compact—breaking with the tradition of or-
dinary international law, which leaves member states free to choose the 
domestic means to give effect to the commitments undertaken at the 
international level—obliges the Contracting Parties to incorporate the 
“golden rule” in state constitutions or in other quasi-constitutional 
sources of law which ought to bind the ordinary budgetary process.36 
Third, the Fiscal Compact sets up an intrusive enforcement mecha-
nism, which authorizes Contracting Parties to bring cases against non-
compliant states before the ECJ, and empowers the ECJ to sanction 
disobedient states with substantial financial penalties.37 Respect of the 
“golden rule,” in addition, is made a condition to obtain financial assis-
                                                                                                                      
31TSCG, supra note 1, art. 8(1). 
32 Id. art. 8(2). 
33 Id. pmbl. (twenty-seventh recital). 
34 See Editorial Comments, supra note 7, at 1–3. 
35 See TSCG, supra note 1, art. 3(1). 
36 Id. art. 3(2). 
37 Id. art. 8. 
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tance under the ESM.38 Given the sweeping nature of these provisions, 
it is worth exploring the legal source that has been taken as a model for 
the “golden rule” of the Fiscal Compact and examine the challenges 
that its incorporation will raise in some of the EU member states. 
II. The “Golden Rule” in State Constitutions 
 In light of the analysis of the Fiscal Compact’s provisions, this Part 
will consider the budgetary constraints which currently exist, or are 
under discussion, in four selected countries of the Euro-zone. The first 
section will examine Germany and underline how the “golden rule” 
introduced in German law with the 2009 constitutional reform has 
served as the model for the drafting of the “golden rule” in the Fiscal 
Compact. The following three sections will then assess the introduction 
of balanced-budget rules into the constitutions of Spain, Italy, and 
France. Selection of these countries as case studies is based on both 
pragmatic and methodological reasons. On one hand, Germany, 
France, Italy, and Spain are the largest countries of the Euro-zone and 
alone account for more than seventy-five percent of the entire EMU’s 
GDP.39 Assessing how fiscal constraints are designed in these states is 
therefore important in any discussion about the future financial stabil-
ity of the Euro-zone. On the other hand, these countries are also en-
dowed with very different institutional settings, with regard to both the 
framework of government and the system of constitutional review.40 
Italy and Spain, like Germany, have parliamentary systems (although 
Italy has a very fragmented party-system whereas the latter two are con-
solidated bipolar democracies) while France is a semi-presidential re-
gime.41 Moreover, although in all selected countries constitutional re-
view of legislation is centralized in specialized Constitutional Courts, 
there are important differences in the judicial procedure in force in 
the four countries. For example, in France, legislation can be reviewed 
a priori, while in Italy, review is only conducted ex post and upon referral 
                                                                                                                      
38 Id. pmbl. (twenty-seventh recital). 
39 Gross Domestic Product at Market Prices, Eurostat, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/ 
tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tec00001 (last visited 
Jan. 20, 2013). In 2011, the aggregate GDP of Germany, France, Italy, and Spain amounted 
to 76.61% of the Euro-zone’s GDP. Id. I am grateful to Claudia Foroni for helping me with 
the search of the data and calculations. 
40 See Alec Stone Sweet, Governing with Judges: Constitutional Politics in 
Europe 40–41, 44–46 (2000). 
41 See id. at 40–41. 
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of a judge.42 Alternatively, Spain and Germany allow for direct individ-
ual recourse to the Constitutional Court.43 This variety of institutional 
settings can, therefore, offer valuable insights to differentiate the impli-
cations that the Fiscal Compact’s implementation at the state level may 
have for political branches and courts.44 
A. Germany 
 Given the prominent role Germany has played in managing the 
Euro-zone crisis and requiring that EMU states enact tighter budgetary 
constraints in exchange for greater financial solidarity, it will be no sur-
prise that Article 3 of the Fiscal Compact largely draws from the “gold-
en rule” that Germany enacted in its Basic Law—the German Constitu-
tion (GC)—in July 2009.45 In the context of a broader reform of the 
German federal system, in fact, the so-called Föderalismusreform II (Fed-
eralism Reform II) introduced a number of relevant amendments to 
the Finanzwesen, the chapter of the GC dedicated to the fiscal relation-
ship between the Bund (Federation) and the Länder (Regions).46 In 
particular, the new Article 109 GC, besides reaffirming the budgetary 
autonomy of the Federation and the Länder, and noting their joint re-
sponsibility in the maintenance of the budgetary discipline set at the 
EU level in the SGP, states the general rule that: 
The budgets of the Federation and the Länder shall in princi-
ple be balanced without revenue from credits. The Federation 
and Länder may introduce rules intended to take into ac-
count, symmetrically in times of upswing and downswing, the 
effects of market developments that deviate from normal 
conditions, as well as exceptions for natural disasters or un-
usual emergency situations beyond governmental control and 
                                                                                                                      
42 See Federico Fabbrini, Kelsen in Paris: France’s Constitutional Reform and the Introduction 
of A Posteriori Constitutional Review of Legislation, 9 Ger. L.J. 1297, 1302–03 (2008); Tania 
Groppi, The Italian Constitutional Court: Towards a ‘Multilevel System’ of Constitutional Review?, 
3 J. Comp. L. 100, 102–03 (2008). 
43 See generally Victor Ferreres Comella, The Spanish Constitutional Court: Time for Re-
forms, 3 J. Comp. L. 22 (2008); Donald P. Kommers & Russell A. Miller, Das Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht: Procedure, Practice and Policy of the German Federal Constitutional Court, 3 J. Comp. 
L. 194 (2008). 
44 See infra Part III. 
45 See Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [Grundgesetz][GG] 
[Basic Law], May 23, 1949, BGBl. I, arts. 109, 115 (Ger.), translation available at https:// 
www.btg-bestellservice.de/pdf/80201000.pdf. 
46 See Lars P. Feld & Thushyanthan Baskaran, Federalism, Budget Deficits and Public Debt: 
On the Reform of Germany’s Fiscal Constitution, 6 Rev. L. & Econ. 365, 384–85 (2010). 
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substantially harmful to the state’s financial capacity. For such 
exceptional regimes, a corresponding amortisation plan must 
be adopted.47 
 The content of the “golden rule” is further specified, as far as the 
German federal government is concerned, in Article 115(2) GC, which 
states that “[r]evenues and expenditures shall in principle be balanced 
without revenue from credits,” and clarifies that “[t]his principle shall 
be satisfied when revenue obtained by the borrowing of funds does not 
exceed 0.35 percent in relation to the nominal [GDP].”48 This provi-
sion thus sets a more restrictive deficit brake than the 0.5% allowed by 
Article 3(1)(b) of the Fiscal Compact.49 The strict “golden rule” is miti-
gated, however, by the possibility of taking into account symmetrical 
periods of upswing and downswing “when economic developments de-
viate from normal conditions,” and allowing for minor deviations on 
the basis of the economic cycle.50 In addition, the balanced-budget re-
quirement is accompanied by an exception clause which largely antici-
pated the one later enshrined in Article 3(3)(b) of the Fiscal Com-
pact.51 Thus, “[i]n cases of natural catastrophes or unusual emergency 
situations beyond governmental control and substantially harmful to 
the state’s financial capacity, these credit limits may be exceeded . . . by 
a majority” decision of the members of the Bundestag, the Lower House 
of the Federal Parliament.52 “The decision has to be combined with an 
amortisation plan.”53 The 1949 GC, as amended in 2009, therefore, is 
endowed with a very comprehensive and technically detailed balanced-
budget requirement that Germany decided autonomously to enact to 
ensure compliance with its EMU obligations, and to safeguard the sus-
tainability of public finance for future generations.54 
                                                                                                                      
 
47 Grundgesetz, supra note 45, art. 109. 
48 Id. art. 115(2). 
49 See id.; TSCG, supra note 1, art. 3. 
50 Grundgesetz, supra note 45, art. 115(2). 
51 See id.; TSCG, supra note 1, art. 3(3)(b). 
52 Grundgesetz, supra note 45, art. 115(2). 
53 Id. 
54 See Azoulai, supra note 2, at 12. In light of the analysis of the “golden rule” in the 
GC, and of the direct influence that this provision has played in the drafting of the Fiscal 
Compact, it is ironic that the German government decided to ratify the Fiscal Compact 
with a two-thirds parliamentary majority, as if the Fiscal Compact was introducing a new 
amendment to the GC. See Testing the Limits: Even Germany Has Constitutional Worries About 
More European Integration, Economist, Mar. 24, 2012, at 31, available at http://www. 
economist.com/node/21551102. As has been suggested, the decision to opt for qualified 
majority voting may be driven by the desire to “impress” the increasingly Euro-skeptical 
German Constitutional Court, which was ultimately empowered to decide whether the 
12 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 36:1 
B. Spain 
 Even before serving as a model for the Fiscal Compact, the GC was 
used as a source of inspiration for constitutional reform in Spain.55 As 
the interest rates of Spanish sovereign bonds were beginning to sky-
rocket late in the summer of 2011, the incumbent Spanish government 
rushed a constitutional amendment aimed at establishing a balanced-
budget requirement and allegedly reassuring the financial markets 
through Parliament.56 The new Article 135 of the Spanish Constitution 
(SC)—which was approved with bipartisan support in both chambers 
of the legislature in less than two weeks and entered into force on Sep-
tember 27, 2011—now affirms in its first two paragraphs that “[a]ll pub-
lic administrations will conform their actions to the principle of budg-
etary stability. The State and the Autonomous Communities shall not 
incur a structural deficit that exceeds the standard established by the 
EU.”57 A numerical indication of the maximum structural deficit in re-
lation to the GDP for both the State and the Autonomous Communi-
ties is not directly provided by the SC, but will be specified in a ley or-
ganica (organic law), a special source of law (with infra-constitutional 
but supra-legislative status) which the Chamber of Deputies approves by 
an absolute majority.58 Together with the deficit brake, the SC constitu-
tionalizes the limits of the SGP on public debt.59 According to Article 
135(3), “the total volume of debt of the public administrations with 
                                                                                                                      
Fiscal Compact was compatible with the GC or required a constitutional revision to be 
ratified. In its decision of September 12, 2012, the German Constitutional Court eventually 
validated the constitutionality of the Fiscal Compact, and simultaneously upheld the ESM 
Treaty’s compatibility with the GC. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG][Federal Consti-
tutional Court] Sept. 12, 2012, No. 2 BvR 1390/12, http://www.bverfg.de/en/decisions/ 
rs20120912_2bvr139012en.html. 
55 See Victor Mallet, Spanish MPs Approve Debt Limit, Fin. Times (Sept. 2, 2011, 3:16 PM), 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/074c8362-d55f-11e0-bd7e-00144feab49a.html#axzz2HPjtXlZq. 
56 See generally La Reforma de l’Articulo 135 CE, Revista Española de Derecho Consti-
tucional, Sept.–Dec. 2011, at 159 (analyzing the reforms to Article 135 and its impact on 
the Spanish Constitution). 
57 Constitución Española, B.O.E. n. 311, art. 135, Dec. 29, 1978 (revised Sept. 27, 
2011) (author’s translation) (“Todas las Administraciones Públicas adecuarán sus actuaciones 
al principio de estabilidad presupuestaria. El Estado y las Comunidades Autónomas no po-
drán incurrir en un déficit estructural que supere los márgenes establecidos, en su caso, por 
la Union Europea . . . .”). 
58 See id. arts. 31, 135(2). 
59 See id. art. 135. 
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reference to the GDP shall not exceed the reference value established 
in the TFEU.”60 
 Also in Spain, the “golden rule” of a balanced budget is subject to 
an exception clause.61 Article 135(4) states that: 
[t]he limits of the structural deficit and of the volume of pub-
lic debt can only be exceeded in cases of natural catastrophes, 
economic recession or situations of extraordinary emergency 
beyond the control of the State which considerably endanger 
the financial situation or the economic and social sustainabil-
ity of the State, to be assessed by the absolute majority of the 
members of the Chamber of Deputies.62 
While the implementation of the Spanish constitutional reform still 
requires the adoption of an organic law to develop the principles estab-
lished in new Article 135 SC, it can be argued that the 2011 amend-
ment largely anticipates the obligations of the Fiscal Compact and may 
thus be regarded as compatible with the “golden rule” which is therein 
established.63 With wise drafting, Article 135 SC dynamically refers to 
the deficit and debt limits set up at the EU level, and can thus easily be 
adapted to the new, stricter requirements imposed by the Fiscal Com-
pact.64 Moreover, through the enactment of an organic law, the bal-
anced-budget rule of the SC can be further specified with technical cri-
teria.65 Accordingly, it would seem that no additional implementing 
measures would be needed at the constitutional level for Spain to com-
ply with the Fiscal Compact.66 
                                                                                                                      
 
60 Id. art. 135(3) (author’s translation) (“El volumen de deuda pública del conjunto de 
las Administraciones Públicas en relación con el producto interior bruto del Estado no 
podrá superar el valor de referencia establecido en el TFUE.”). 
61 See id. 
62 Id. art. 135(4) (author’s translation) (“Los límites de déficit estructural y de volu-
men de deuda pública sólo podrán superarse en caso de catástrofes naturales, recesión 
económica o situaciones de emergencia extraordinaria que escapen al control del Estado y 
perjudiquen considerablemente la situación financiera o la sostenibilidad económica o 
social del Estado, apreciadas por la mayoría absoluta de los miembros del Congreso de los 
Diputados.”). 
63 See id. art. 135; TSCG, supra note 1, art. 3. 
64 See C.E., B.O.E. n. 311, art. 135(4), Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain) (revised Sept. 27, 2011). 
65 See id. art. 135(2). 
66 See TSCG, supra note 1, art. 3. An entirely different matter is whether the Spanish 
government will be effectively able to comply with the rules it has enshrined in its own 
Constitution under the pressure of the EU institutions. It is well known that hours after 
signing the Fiscal Compact, the Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy communicated in a 
press release that Spain would not be able to respect the deficit-reduction criteria provided 
by the Fiscal Compact. See Joshua Chaffin & Victor Mallet, Spain Defies EU over Deficit Rules, 
14 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 36:1 
C. France 
 The constitutional situation of Spain contrasts sharply with that of 
France.67 At the moment, France has not yet amended its 1958 Consti-
tution (FC) to establish a balanced-budget requirement.68 A constitu-
tional reform bill was introduced in Parliament by the government on 
March 16, 2011 and approved in the same wording, after several read-
ings, by the National Assembly and the Senate on July 13, 2011.69 To 
enter into force, however, the constitutional amendment requires ei-
ther a vote of approval by the two chambers of Parliament sitting jointly 
in Congress, or by the electorate in a referendum.70 The changes in the 
government after the election of May 2012 have for all purposes en-
sured the end of any prospect of constitutional reform.71 Nevertheless, 
it is doubtful whether the proposed constitutional reform would have 
been fully consistent with the strict requirements of the Fiscal Com-
pact.72 Arguably, the proposed amendment to the FC would have only 
introduced a “golden rule lite.”73 According to the proposed new Arti-
                                                                                                                      
Fin. Times (Mar. 2, 2012, 6:50 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/eabdded8-6462-
11e1-b50e-00144feabdc0.html. 
67 See Pierre Garello & Vesselina Spassova, French 2011 Fiscal Reforms in Retrospect, Inst. 
for Res. Econ. & Fiscal Issues (May 28, 2012), http://www.irefeurope.org/en/content/ 
french-2011-fiscal-reforms-retrospect. 
68 Id. 
69 Helene Fouquet, French Lawmakers Endorse Constitutional Rule on Balanced Budgets, 
Bloomberg ( July 13, 2011, 5:55 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-07-13/ 
french-lawmakers-endorse-constitutional-rule-on-balanced-budgets.html. 
70 See 1958 Const. art. 89 (Fr.). See generally L’introduction de la “Règle d’Or” Budgetaire 
Dans la Constitution, in Constitutions 23 (2011) (reporting the opinion of academics and 
parliamentarians on the constitutional reform bill). 
71 The new French President, Francois Hollande of the Socialist Party, expressed during 
the spring 2012 Presidential campaign his intention to renegotiate the Fiscal Compact if 
elected. See Steven Erlanger & Nicholas Kulish, French Front-Runner Says He’d Seek to Renegotiate 
Fiscal Treaty if Elected, N.Y. Times, Apr. 26, 2012, at A8. Incidentally it may also be noticed that 
the Fiscal Compact—breaking also on this account with the established tradition in the EU—
requires the approval of only 12 states for its entry into force, rather than unanimity. See 
TSCG, supra note 1, art. 14(2). The reason for introducing this rule was to avoid the veto of 
those member states where the ratification or implementation of the Fiscal Compact might 
have been more troublesome. France, which rejected key European treaties in 1954 and 
2005, is certainly one of the countries where the risk of a “no-vote” on the Fiscal Compact 
could be significant. See Carlos Closa Montero, Moving Away from Unanimity: Ratification of the 
Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union 1, 11 (Recon-
stituting Democracy in Eur., Working Paper No. 2011/38, 2011), available at http://www. 
reconproject.eu/main.php/RECON_wp_1138.pdf?fileitem=5456490. 
72 See TSCG, supra note 1, art. 3(2); France: Stability Programme 2011–2014, at 32 (Apr. 
2011), available at http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/ 
pdf/20_scps/2011/01_programme/fr_2011-05-03_sp_en.pdf. 
73 See France: Stability Programme 2011–2014, supra note 72, at 32. 
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cle 34(20) FC, the objective of strengthening budgetary constraints was 
ensured through the enactment of a new source of law—called lois-
cadres d’équilibre des finances publiques, or framework laws on the equilib-
rium of public finance—which determined “the multi-annual orienta-
tions, the norms of evolution and the management rules of the public 
finances, with the goal to assure the equilibrium of the budget of the 
public administrations” for at least three years.74 
 The framework laws on the equilibrium of public finance ought to 
dictate the fiscal standards to be followed in enacting the yearly budget-
ary law, and—as clarified by the proposed new Article 47(1) FC—no 
budget could be approved in the absence of a framework law applicable 
to the concerned fiscal year.75 Furthermore, according to the prospec-
tive Article 61(2) FC, the French Constitutional Council would have had 
to review budgetary laws every year “before their entry into force”76 for 
their compatibility with the loi-cadres d’équilibre des finances publiques.77 
 As this summary reveals, significant differences existed between 
the provisions of the proposed amendment to the FC and the rules of 
the Fiscal Compact.78 The French reform did not codify a clear rule to 
prevent government deficit or impose a yearly balanced budget.79 By 
devising a new legal instrument—the framework laws—the existing 
constitutional reform bill would only establish a flexible duty for the 
government to ensure fiscal equilibrium over a three-year span.80 The 
indeterminacy of this obligation explains the absence of exception 
clauses analogous to those in the Fiscal Compact, the GC, and the SC.81 
Moreover, according to draft Article 46-1 FC, the conditions for ap-
proval of the framework law had to be set in a loi organique (an organic 
                                                                                                                      
74 Projet de loi constitutionelle du 13 juillet 2011 relatif a l’equilibre des finances pub-
liques [Draft Constitutional Law of July 13, 2011 Relating to the Balance of Public Fi-
nances], Assemblée Nationale [National Assembly], July 13, 2011, art. 1, http://www. 
assemblee-nationale.fr/13/ta/ta0722.asp [hereinafter Draft Constitutional Law of July 13, 
2011] (author’s translation) (draft amendment of art. 34(20) FC). The original version in 
French reads: “pour au moins trois années, les orientations pluriannuelles, les normes 
d’évolution et les règles de gestion des finances publiques, en vue d’assurer l’équilibre des 
comptes des administrations publiques.” Id. 
75 Id. art. 5(1) (draft amendment of art. 47(1) FC). 
76 Id. art. 10(2) (author’s translation) (draft amendment of art. 61(2) FC). The origi-
nal version in French reads: “avant leur promulgation.” Id. 
77 Id. 
78 See supra text accompanying notes 19–25, 72–77. 
79 See France: Stability Programme 2011–2014, supra note 72, at 32. 
80 See Draft Constitutional Law of July 13, 2011, supra note 74, art. 1 (draft amendment 
of art. 34(20) FC). 
81 Id. 
16 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 36:1 
law to be approved by absolute majority of the National Assembly),82 
thus granting the governing majority wide room to modulate the ef-
fects of the budgetary constraints on the basis of other political incen-
tives.83 All in all, it would seem that the French project of constitutional 
reform was not in line with the developments which have subsequently 
occurred in the EU through the enactment of the Fiscal Compact.84 
The new French government, however, has recently abandoned the 
prospect of a constitutional reform to incorporate the Fiscal Compact 
in domestic law, and opted instead for the enactment of a loi organique, 
as permitted by the Fiscal Compact itself.85 
D. Italy 
 Contrary to the high level of politicization that has characterized 
the proposal to amend the FC to introduce tighter budgetary rules in 
France, the reform of the 1948 Italian Constitution (IC) to enshrine 
the “golden rule” has been notable for the high level of political con-
sensus among parties—an unusual phenomenon in a country which is 
otherwise characterized by extremely polarized and litigious political 
elites.86 The peculiar conditions that led to the creation of the Monti 
government in November 2011, at the height of the speculative attack 
against the Italian sovereign bonds, may explain the widespread sup-
port that the proposal to introduce the “golden rule” in the IC has re-
ceived from political parties in both chambers of Parliament.87 The 
constitutional revision bill to amend the budgetary provisions of the IC 
was originally sponsored by the previous government.88 Yet, the Monti 
                                                                                                                      
82 See 1958 Const. art. 46 (Fr.). 
83 See Draft Constitutional Law of July 13, 2011, supra note 74, art. 4 (draft amendment 
of art. 46-1 FC). 
84 See TSCG, supra note 1, art. 3(2). 
85 The President of the French Republic submitted to the Constitutional Council a re-
quest pursuant to Article 54 FC, to ask prospectively whether the ratification of the Fiscal 
Compact required a constitutional revision of the FC. Conseil constitutionnel 
[CC][Constitutional Court] decision No. 2012-653DC, Aug. 9, 2012, available at 
http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/root/bank/pdf/conseil-const 
itutionnel-115501.pdf. In its decision of August 9, 2012, the Constitutional Court replied that 
the ratification of the Treaty did not require a constitutional change and that the obligation to 
incorporate the “golden rule” in French law could be undertaken via the enactment of a loi 
organique. Id. 
86 See Shoaib-ur-Rehman Siddiqui, Italy Approves Balanced-Budget Amendment to Constitu-
tion; Bus. Recorder (Apr. 18, 2012, 12:26 AM), http://www.brecorder.com/top-news/109-
world-top-news/53572-italy-approves-balanced-budget-amendment-to-constitution-.html. 
87 See Michael Schuman, The Most Important Man in Europe, Time, Feb. 20, 2012, at 28, 30 
(describing the economic conditions that led to the creation of the Monti government). 
88 Siddiqui, supra note 86. 
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government explicitly endorsed the proposal while in office, identifying 
the amendment as an important commitment Italy had to undertake 
vis-à-vis its EU partners.89 This ensured speedy approval both in the 
Chamber of Deputies and in the Senate, which are required to vote 
twice on the same text at a distance of three months between the first 
and the second reading,90 and the Constitutional Revision Act was 
signed into law on April 20, 2012.91 
 The new Article 81 IC provides that: 
The State ensures the balance between revenue and expendi-
tures in its budget, considering the upswings and the down-
swings of the economic cycle. The State can resort to the emis-
sion of debt only with the purpose to consider the effects of 
the economic cycle and, upon authorization of the two cham-
bers of Parliament adopted at the absolute majority of its 
members, in cases of exceptional events.92 
Article 81 IC then introduces a new source of law in the Italian legal sys-
tem, modelled on the Spanish ley organica and the French loi organique, 
empowering Parliament to adopt, at the absolute majority of its mem-
bers, a special budgetary statute.93 The statute is designed to establish 
“[t]he content of the budgetary laws, the fundamental norms and the 
criteria to ensure the balance between the revenues and the expendi-
tures of the budget and the sustainability of the debt of all public ad-
ministrations.”94 The obligation of a balanced budget is then extended, 
by the new Article 119, to the Regions, which are required to “ensure 
respect of the economic and financial constraints deriving from the 
                                                                                                                      
89 See id. 
90 See Art. 138 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.). 
91 See Legge Costituzionale 20 aprile 2012, n. 1, in G. U. del 23 Aprile 2012, n. 95 (It.). 
See generally Daniele Cabras, L’introduzione del principio del c.d. pareggio di bilancio: una regola 
importante per la stabilizzazione della finanza pubblica, 2012 Quaderni Costituzionali 111 
(discussing the constitutional reforms in Italy). 
92 Art. 81 Cost. (author’s translation) (“Lo Stato assicura l’equilibrio tra le entrate e le 
spese del proprio bilancio, tenendo conto delle fasi avverse e delle fasi favorevoli del ciclo 
economico. Il ricorso all’indebitamento è consentito solo al fine di considerare gli effetti 
del ciclo economico e, previa autorizzazione delle Camere adottata a maggioranza assoluta 
dei rispettivi componenti, al verificarsi di eventi eccezionali.”). 
93 See id. 
94 Id. (author’s translation) (“Il contenuto della legge di bilancio, le norme fondamentali 
e i criteri volti ad assicurare l’equilibrio tra le entrate e le spese dei bilanci e la sostenibilità 
del debito del complesso delle pubbliche amministrazioni . . . .”). 
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EU.”95 Overall, the constitutional amendment of the IC strengthens It-
aly’s commitment toward budgetary discipline.96 Nevertheless, it could 
be argued that, because of their rather generic formulation, the new 
constitutional provisions do not entirely incorporate the “golden rule” 
of the Fiscal Compact.97 Despite these discrepancies, it is possible that in 
enacting the special statute required by Article 81 IC, Parliament will 
fulfil the Fiscal Compact requirements.98 Yet, at the moment, it remains 
uncertain whether this new special statute will be regarded as part of the 
bloc of constitutionality used by the Italian Constitutional Court in the 
review of legislation, as is specifically required by Article 3(2) of the Fis-
cal Compact.99 Most likely, this issue will have to be decided by the Ital-
ian Constitutional Court. 
III. The Institutional Implications of the “Golden Rule” 
 As the previous Part has explained, the introduction of the “golden 
rule” in the Fiscal Compact was anticipated by the enactment of tight 
budgetary constraints in the GC and the SC.100 Similarly, the prospect of 
the enactment of the Fiscal Compact has worked as a powerful incentive 
for completing constitutional revision in Italy.101 Leaving aside the ques-
tion whether all state constitutional provisions are fully consistent with 
the detailed obligations of the Fiscal Compact, an overview of the four 
major economies of the Euro-zone, demonstrates that only France is 
currently without any constitutional limitation on government spend-
ing.102 In light of this consistent trend toward the constitutionalization 
of rules on budgetary discipline, this Part discusses the plausible institu-
tional implications of the adoption of the “golden rule” for the political 
branches and courts of both the member states and the EU. The first 
section will focus on the role of executives and legislatures by analyzing 
how budgetary constraints affect the relationship between parliaments 
and cabinets, and by suggesting that the impact of the “golden rule” is 
likely to change in light of each state’s form of government. The second 
                                                                                                                      
95 Art. 119 Cost.; L.C. n. 1/2012, art. 4 (It.) (amending Art. 119 Costituzione) (author’s 
translation). (“assicurare l'osservanza dei vincoli economici e finanziari derivanti 
dall’ordinamento dell’Unione europea.”). 
96 See Siddiqui, supra note 86. 
97 See Art. 81 Cost.; TSCG, supra note 1, art. 3(2). 
98 See Art. 81 Cost.; TSCG, supra note 1, art. 3(2). 
99 See Groppi, supra note 42, at 102–04 (describing the limited types of actions to acti-
vate constitutional review in Italy). 
100 See supra Part II.A–B. 
101 See supra Part II.D. 
102 See supra Part II.C. 
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section will focus on the role of state courts, emphasizing how the con-
stitutionalization of fiscal rules will strengthen the role of Constitutional 
Courts throughout Europe, but hinting that this development is bound 
to raise significant procedural challenges in several EU member states. 
As will be explained in the third section, however, the introduction of 
the “golden rule” in state constitutional law is likely to have profound 
implications on the role of the EU political and judicial institutions, 
both of which will find themselves in a stronger position to guide and 
oversee the fiscal policies of the member states. 
A. The Role of State Executives and Legislatures 
 The existence of a balanced-budget requirement in state constitu-
tions places an obligation on the political branches to devise budgetary 
laws that comply with the fiscal constraints of the state constitution.103 As 
such, executives are expected to propose, and parliaments ultimately to 
approve, annual budget laws which are either at a surplus or on balance 
(or at worst have a deficit not exceeding that permitted by the Fiscal 
Compact).104 Generally speaking, these new legal constraints are likely 
to have an impact on the budgetary policies of various EU member 
states, notably in countries like Italy or Spain where political elites have 
traditionally been less concerned with the sustainability of public fi-
nances, and have repeatedly subsidized government spending by raising 
public debts.105 Yet, besides the relevant cultural factors, it is likely that 
the impact of the “golden rule” on the role of the political branches of 
state governments will vary on the basis of the institutional features of 
the system of government of each member state.106 In particular, the 
adoption of the “golden rule” will affect executives and legislatures and 
their relationship in different ways depending on the nature of the 
budgetary process in place in any given state. 
 In this regard, a crucial factor in explaining the implications of the 
“golden rule” is the role parliament currently exercises in the budgetary 
                                                                                                                      
103 See Azoulai, supra note 2, at 5. 
104 See id. at 14. 
105 See Mark Hallerberg, Fiscal Federalism Reforms in the European Union and the Greek Cri-
sis, 12 Euro. Union Pol.127, 135, 138–39 (2012). 
106 See generally Maurice Duverger, Les Grands Systèmes Politiques (1970) (compar-
ing forms of government in different institutional regimes); Giovanni Sartori, Compara-
tive Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives, and Out-
comes (2d ed. 1997) (comparing institutional roles in different democratic systems). 
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process.107 In comparative terms, parliaments can function either as de-
cision-makers—with a sizeable role in designing the substance of the 
yearly budget—or as oversight bodies—with limited capacity to influ-
ence the drafting of the budget, but greater powers in overseeing its im-
plementation.108 Parliaments generally exercise a more prominent deci-
sion-making function in parliamentary systems in which executives do 
not enjoy political majorities and where the budget is the result of po-
litical bargaining between the cabinet and parliamentary leaders.109 On 
the contrary, in semi-presidential systems and parliamentary systems in 
which executives have strong and obedient parliamentary majorities, 
parliaments largely exercise an ex post function in the budgetary process, 
which focuses on the oversight (mostly by the opposition in parliament) 
of the execution of the budget by the cabinet.110 In light of this distinc-
tion, it is plausible to maintain that, in the first institutional model, the 
introduction of a “golden rule” will likely strengthen the position of the 
executive branch vis-à-vis parliament.111 In the second institutional con-
text, however, the effects of the “golden rule” are less visible and more 
difficult to predict.112 While the existence of balanced-budget con-
straints is not likely to affect the role of the executives, it may provide 
instruments for parliamentary opposition to make its voice heard. 
 The states considered in this Article offer a broad spectrum of in-
stitutional settings which help empirically explain the institutional dy-
namics that the “golden rule” may trigger between executives and legis-
latures.113 For instance, in Italy, where the executive enjoys limited 
constitutional instruments to force Parliament to approve its budget,114 
the new Article 81 IC may give the government a new means to close 
the debate on its budget proposal and force Parliament to vote its 
                                                                                                                      
107 See generally Ian Lienert, Who Controls the Budget: The Legislature or the Executive? (Int’l 
Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 05/115, 2005) (explaining the various roles legislative 
and executive bodies play in budget-making). 
108 See id. at 7–8. 
109 Id. at 9. 
110 See id. at 7–8, 11. 
111 See id. at 11. It goes without saying, at the same time, that the “golden rule” will re-
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spend to obtain political consensus). Id. at 13. 
112 See id. at 11–14. 
113 See supra Part II. 
114 See Massimo Rubechi, La Sessione di Bilancio in Parlamento: Governi in Fuga, in La 
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Giupponi eds., 2008). 
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bill.115 In the semi-presidential system created by the 1958 FC, by con-
trast, the government—which, save during the so-called cohabitation, is 
under the full control of the directly elected President—already enjoys 
almost total control of the budgetary process.116 Indeed, according to 
Article 49(3) FC, the government may commit its political responsibil-
ity and consider a bill approved by Parliament without even submitting 
it to a vote.117 In this context, the “golden rule” is unlikely to 
strengthen the position of the executive. Yet, it could perhaps give a 
new opportunity for the opposition in Parliament to control the activity 
of the executive by challenging a bill before the Constitutional Coun-
cil.118 The cases of Germany and Spain, finally, lay somewhere in be-
tween the Italian and French extremes. Both countries are parliamen-
tary democracies in which the executives enjoy significant leeway in the 
budgetary process.119 Yet, in both systems the government may be de-
pendent on the political support of junior parties, increasing the diffi-
culties it may face in imposing its budget on Parliament.120 As a conse-
quence, it seems likely that the “golden rule” will have either 
empowering or constraining effects on these countries’ executive 
branches, depending on specific political conditions. 
                                                                                                                     
B. The Role of State Courts 
 The “golden rule” constitutionalizes an obligation on executives to 
propose and legislatures to approve balanced-budget laws yearly.121 Be-
cause in the majority of EU countries the existence of a constitutional 
provision makes it justiciable, the constitutionalization of the “golden 
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rule” inevitably strengthens the role of courts as guardians of fiscal dis-
cipline and comptrollers of the budgetary policies of the political 
branches.122 The increasing empowerment of state courts as a result of 
developments in EU law is in itself nothing new.123 Many scholars have 
emphasized how EU law has consistently enhanced the institutional 
position of courts vis-à-vis the political branches of EU member 
states.124 Nevertheless, whereas EU law has traditionally favored the po-
sition of ordinary judges, the introduction of the “golden rule” in the 
state constitutions benefits the role of Constitutional Courts.125 In most 
EU member states, including all four case studies considered in this 
Article, the task of reviewing the constitutionality of legislation is cen-
tralized in ad hoc, specialized Constitutional Courts.126 It is therefore 
plausible that Constitutional Courts in Germany, Spain, Italy, and (in 
case) France, will through the adoption of the “golden rule” acquire 
new and pervasive competences in the fiscal field, including the ability 
to scrutinize—and strike down—the budgets approved by Parliaments, 
to ensure compliance with the constitutional budgetary constraints. 
 This development is in itself quite remarkable since, until now, the 
role of the judiciary in this area of the law has been negligible in almost 
all the countries here considered.127 The empowerment of state Consti-
tutional Courts in reviewing governmental budgetary policies raises, 
however, serious questions as to judges’ capacity to master the techni-
cally complex economic variables condensed within the “golden rule,” 
and makes it difficult to predict the degree of deference that Constitu-
tional Courts may be willing to grant to the political branches.128 Sig-
nificant concerns are also raised by the possibility that a Constitutional 
Court may be asked to rule on the constitutionality of a budgetary law 
long after the law’s enactment.129 It is hard to imagine the effect of a 
Constitutional Court ruling which retroactively strikes down a budget 
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many years after its enactment. Having said so, it nevertheless seems 
plausible to suggest that the role played by the Constitutional Courts in 
the budgetary field will greatly depend upon the underlying features of 
the state system of constitutional review. In particular, procedural fac-
tors such as the mechanisms by which a Court can be activated and the 
timing within which a Court has to decide a case will be of central im-
portance.130 Therefore, the “golden rule” will most likely be relevant 
for Constitutional Courts in systems endowed with broad mechanisms 
of constitutional review, while it will be more restricted (and potentially 
dangerous) in those systems in which Constitutional Courts can only be 
involved well after the conclusion of the budgetary process. 
 The four countries considered in this Article offer examples of 
how the effects of the “golden rule” will likely combine with alternative 
procedural mechanisms of constitutional review. Hence, for instance, 
the constitutionalization of budgetary constraints works well in a state 
like Germany, characterized by a powerful Constitutional Court which 
can review acts of Parliament in essentially any form.131 Under the pro-
cedural mechanisms of the GC, in fact, the Constitutional Court could 
be requested to review the constitutionality of a budget at an early 
stage, thus ensuring quick oversight on the activity of Parliament.132 
The same considerations seem to apply also for the Spanish Constitu-
tional Court, whose powers are largely based on the German model.133 
In France, the Constitutional Council has been traditionally entrusted 
to review legislation before its enactment.134 Hence, the possibility of 
scrutinizing a budget bill (which, according to the proposed new Arti-
cle 61 FC, would have been a duty)135 would not have significantly al-
tered the current function of the Constitutional Council.136 In Italy, on 
the contrary, the Constitutional Court can only review acts of Parlia-
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ment a posteriori, either upon referral of a judge who doubts the consti-
tutionality of a statute she must apply to a pending case or upon a chal-
lenge by a Region.137 Since the recent Italian constitutional reform has 
not introduced any change in the procedural mechanisms to activate 
the Constitutional Court, it is unclear how effectively a case against a 
budget bill could be brought before the Constitutional Court.138 
C. The Role of Supranational Institutions 
 As the preceding analysis has clarified, the enactment of the 
“golden rule” in state constitutions is bound to have institutional impli-
cations on both the relationships between the political branches and 
the role of Constitutional Courts in the member states.139 The nature 
of such institutional changes is likely to be asymmetric, varying from 
state to state on the basis of pre-existing factors like the function of par-
liaments in budgetary procedures, and the procedural mechanisms 
utilized by Constitutional Courts to review legislation.140 What seems 
instead to be symmetrically occurring in all member states as a result of 
the introduction of the “golden rule” is a power shift in favor of supra-
national institutions.141 The Fiscal Compact imposes strict budgetary 
rules on the member states and provides for new enforcement mecha-
nisms, which are likely to empower both the ECJ and the European 
Commission vis-à-vis the states.142 Regarding the role of the suprana-
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tional judiciary, it has already been mentioned that the obligation of 
the states to incorporate the “golden rule” in domestic law is policed by 
the ECJ.143 Because it is entrusted to decide whether a state has fulfilled 
its obligations under Article 3(2) of the Fiscal Compact, the ECJ is vest-
ed with the authority to oversee the national constitutional revision 
processes and sanction states whose constitutional amendments are in-
consistent with the Fiscal Compact.144 Although EU precedent shows 
that the ECJ has never hesitated to declare the unlawfulness of state 
constitutional provisions that were incompatible with EU law,145 the 
additional power of judicial review that the ECJ now enjoys on the basis 
of the “golden rule” appears more sweeping, as it directly impacts the 
exercise of the constituent power of a state to amend its constitution.146 
                                                                                                                     
 In addition, although Article 8 of the Fiscal Compact technically 
only empowers the ECJ to enforce the obligation to enact the “golden 
rule” at the state level, it cannot be overlooked that the ECJ may over 
time acquire a role in enforcing the obligation of states to respect the 
“golden rule” in the budgetary procedures.147 As explained in the pre-
vious section, state Constitutional Courts will be primarily vested with 
the duty to review state political branches’ compliance with the “golden 
rule.”148 Yet, budgetary policy and fiscal standards are increasingly 
regulated by EU law; besides the Fiscal Compact, one must consider the 
provisions of the EU treaties along with the new comprehensive legisla-
tive framework established by the so-called “six-pack” regulations,149 
which provide detailed indications on how state budgets should look.150 
Taking into account the obligation of state courts to refer preliminary 
questions to the ECJ on matters of interpretation of EU law,151 it is con-
ceivable that the ECJ may be asked to rule on the compatibility of a 
state budget with provisions of EU law.152 Needless to say, this hypothe-
sis is advanced here in merely speculative terms; it seems likely at the 
same time, that relevant national variations may shape the state courts’ 
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willingness to refer questions concerning state budgetary law to the 
ECJ.153 Nevertheless, the prospect of something of this sort happening 
elucidates the potentially unprecedented transformations that the 
“golden rule” may generate in the role of the ECJ.154 
 The power shift toward the EU that the Fiscal Compact produces, 
however, is not exclusively to the advantage of the judiciary.155 Political 
institutions like the European Commission will also gain influence from 
the existence of strict rules binding national authorities in the exercise 
of their budgetary competences.156 In this regard, one has to bear in 
mind that the Fiscal Compact builds upon a set of EU constitutional 
and legislative measures which have recently accorded to the Commis-
sion a pervasive role in the guidance and oversight of the national 
budgetary procedures.157 In particular, the so-called “European semes-
ter” was set up in 2010,158 and requires states to submit every spring to 
the Commission a draft of their budget laws that takes into account the 
parameters of the economic situation of the country previously pre-
pared by the Commission.159 The Commission can request changes 
when it believes that the draft national budget would run afoul of EU 
economic and fiscal objectives.160 Budgets are then presented domesti-
cally in parliaments each fall, after having received the Commission’s 
approval.161 Moreover, pursuant to the excessive deficit procedure of 
Article 126 TFEU, the Commission is empowered to propose to the 
Council of Ministers (the EU body representing the executives of the 
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member states) the adoption of measures, including fines, against 
states that do not comply with the deficit limits of the SGP.162 For the 
states that signed the Fiscal Compact, Article 7 enhances the Commis-
sion’s power in this procedure by committing the states to accept the 
Commission’s proposal unless a qualified majority in the Council of 
Ministers opposes the decision.163 
 In this context, the “golden rule” in the Fiscal Compact provides 
another instrument of control for the Commission over the states’ 
budgetary procedures, contributing further to the centralization at the 
EU level of core policymaking functions in the fiscal domain. By relying 
on the strict and detailed balanced-budget rules mandated by the Fiscal 
Compact, the Commission will be able to exercise a more pervasive ex 
ante scrutiny on the sustainability and appropriateness of the draft 
budget bills which the governments submit for approval during the 
European Semester.164 At the same time, the Commission will gain 
more effective powers of ex post oversight on the budgetary perform-
ances of the states, with the possibility—besides naming the states 
which have not incorporated the “golden rule,” and thus opening the 
way for a case before the ECJ165—of adopting semi-automatic sanctions 
against states with excessive deficits.166 From this point of view, in the 
end, it emerges that the Fiscal Compact, with its balanced-budget re-
quirement, adds another stone to the path of increasing centralization 
in the EU constitutional framework, enhancing the role of the EU judi-
cial and political institutions.167 Nevertheless, it must be critically em-
phasized that this development does not involve the European Parlia-
ment, which is instead left entirely out of the new architecture of the 
Euro-zone, weakening the legitimacy of the transfer of growing slices of 
political authority at the EU level.168 In light the implications of the Fis-
cal Compact on the existing federal balance between the states and the 
EU, it is now worth comparing how the challenges of ensuring state 
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fiscal discipline in an economic and monetary union have been histori-
cally addressed in the U.S. federal system. 
IV. Fiscal Federalism in the United States:  
A Comparative Perspective 
 As Randall Henning and Martin Kessler have recently emphasized, 
the experience of the United States in the field of fiscal federalism of-
fers a number of valuable points of comparison to analyze “the dilem-
mas that Europe faces.”169 From a historical perspective, the United 
States, like the EU, has had to address the challenges of creating a 
common currency and managing a union in which states have diverg-
ing economic interests and performances.170 It is therefore helpful to 
explore the extent to which the institutional responses developed by 
the United States to address these challenges are similar to, or different 
from, those currently under discussion in the EU.171 A comparative 
analysis reveals the existence of some similarities.172 Since the mid-
nineteenth century, the U.S. fiscal architecture has been characterized 
by two basic structural tenets.173 First, the federal government has con-
sistently applied a policy of refusing to bail out defaulting states, mak-
ing the states fully responsible for the service of their debt.174 Second, 
the states have incorporated budget constraints in their constitutions to 
prevent excessive government spending and debt accumulation.175 
These features—which are reflected in the EU context in the bailout 
prohibition of Article 125 TFEU and in the “golden rule” mandated by 
the Fiscal Compact—emerged simultaneously in antebellum Amer-
ica.176 Shortly after the foundations of the United States, the federal 
government, under the leadership of Secretary of the Treasury Alex-
ander Hamilton, agreed on the federal assumption of the debt in-
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curred by the states during the Revolutionary War.177 Nevertheless, dur-
ing the 1840s, when a number of states faced financial collapse due to 
an accumulation of speculative investments in infrastructures and pub-
lic utilities, the federal government refused to bail out the defaulting 
states, setting an enduring precedent and creating a strong incentive 
for each state to ensure sustainable budgetary policies.178 
 Hence, beginning with New York in 1846, states have introduced 
constitutional provisions limiting public debt and requiring that state 
budgets be balanced.179 The trend toward the constitutionalization of 
budgetary constraints remained steady after the Civil War, and by the 
end of the nineteenth century most states had adopted statutory 
“golden rules.”180 A contemporary survey reveals that thirty-five states 
currently have constitutional balanced-budget requirements, and four-
teen more have statutory or de facto obligations to ensure balanced 
budget— Vermont being the only state with no such constraints what-
soever.181 The “golden rules” adopted by the states vary significantly in 
their technical formulation and procedural effects.182 While some state 
constitutions include a clear requirement that the legislature approves 
(and the governor signs) a budget law which is on balance,183 other 
states more flexibly require that the governor submits (and the legisla-
ture approves) a budget in which expenditures do not exceed the esti-
mated revenues.184 In the first case, the “golden rule” works as a strict 
condition for the approval of legislation, binding the hands of the po-
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litical branches, while in the second case the rigidity of the “golden 
rule” can be bypassed by over-optimistically predicting the amount of 
financial resources that will be available in the fiscal year and increasing 
the spending accordingly.185 At the same time, the enforcement of the 
“golden rule” also varies significantly among the states.186 While courts 
in few states—notably New Jersey, Ohio, and Texas—have played a 
rather active role in reviewing budget laws to ensure that, despite bal-
anced-budget requirements, proper financing is guaranteed to public 
education as required by the state constitution,187 attempts in many 
other states at legal enforcement of balanced-budget constraints have 
been barred under the “political question doctrine.”188 
 Beyond these analogies, a comparative assessment also highlights 
the existence of relevant differences between the U.S. federal system and 
the economic architecture of the Euro-zone.189 First, while almost all 
U.S. states have enacted balanced-budget requirements in their consti-
tutions, “[i]t is worth emphasizing that this outcome was not the result 
of a strong central government.”190 Each state opted for the “golden 
rule” through political debates that were largely autonomous, albeit 
driven by a common “Jacksonian distrust” for transient majorities and 
their lack of concern for the future.191 As it has been argued “[t]he 
federal government was passive during the adoption of these provisions 
by the states. The federal government certainly did not mandate the 
adoption of these provisions and it does not appear that it was promot-
ing them either.”192 Here lays a first major difference from the dynam-
ics currently at play in the EU, where the adoption of balanced-budget 
amendments in state constitutions is instead dictated and policed at the 
supranational level.193 The process that led to the constitutionalization 
of balanced-budget rules in the U.S. states reflected the notion that 
states were—and ought to be regarded as—fully sovereign fiscal enti-
ties.194 This view, premised on the theory of “dual federalism,” arguably 
                                                                                                                      
185 I am grateful to Daniel Rubinfeld for making this point clear to me. 
186 Henning & Kessler, supra note 169, at 21–22. 
187 I am grateful to David Super for making this point clear to me. 
188 Under this doctrine, courts refuse to hear disputes which are best left to the politi-
cal branches of government. See Louis Fisher, Constitutional Dialogues: Interpreta-
tion as Political Process 110–16 (1988). 
189 See Sheridan, supra note 171, at 1143. 
190 Wibbels, supra note 11, at 498. 
191 See David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 2544, 2606(2005). 
192 Henning & Kessler, supra note 169, at 17. 
193 See id. 
194 See Rodden, supra note 173, at 140–41, 145. 
2013] The Fiscal Compact and the Paradox of EU Federalism 31 
no longer appropriately describes the fiscal relationships between the 
states and the central government in the United States, which is now 
characterized by an overlap of competences.195 Nevertheless, the budg-
etary processes of the states continue even today to remain independ-
ent, and the federal government has no authority to mandate state 
compliance with federal budgetary standards.196 
 Second, in the United States, the fiscal powers of the states have 
been complemented by the rising role of the federal government.197 
Beginning markedly with the New Deal, the federal government has 
become a prominent actor in the governance of macroeconomic policy 
and plays a key role in financially supporting the states through grants 
and monetary transfers for the management of specific programs.198 As 
David Super has explained, the federal government’s fiscal relation-
ships with state governments today reflect a cooperative model, based 
on compensation, capacity, and leadership.199 In addition, because 
state balanced-budget rules essentially force state governments to adopt 
pro-cyclical policies, the Keynesian task to support the economy in 
times of downswing is entirely exercised at the federal level.200 Ulti-
mately, “[t]he New Deal amended [the United States’] implicit fiscal 
constitution by recognizing a new federal responsibility to provide 
countercyclical assistance.”201 Here lays a second major difference be-
tween the United States and the EMU: While the U.S. government has 
powerful instruments to govern the economy—notably the monetary 
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policies of the Federal Reserve202 and the limitless ability to finance 
economic investments through federal bonds203—supranational institu-
tions in the EU lack comparable powers.204 As a consequence, during 
the last eighty years, while the U.S. states have managed their autono-
mous fiscal policies within the limits of their balanced-budget con-
straints, the federal government has simultaneously acquired broad 
control over the general economic and monetary policy of the United 
States and developed means to soften the implications of a recession.205 
                                                                                                                     
V. The Paradox of European Federalism 
 As the previous Part explained, both the EU and the United States 
have central governments committed to, or bound by, no-bail-out poli-
cies regarding defaulting states.206 Moreover, states are endowed with 
strict budgetary requirements in their constitutions.207 Nevertheless, in 
the United States, the federal government plays a macroeconomic role 
in the economy which finds no equivalent in the role currently played 
by the EU institutions.208 At the same time, the fiscal sovereignty that 
the U.S. states enjoy vis-à-vis the federal government contrasts with the 
direct interference that EU institutions have on the budgetary policy of 
the member states.209 This Part builds on the comparison with the U.S. 
experience to reconsider the main innovations introduced by the Fiscal 
Compact and to illuminate a paradox in the new constitutional archi-
tecture of the EMU. The paradox is that, while EU member states have 
willingly refused to embrace a U.S.-like federal model for the govern-
ance of the Euro-zone on the assumption that this was too restrictive of 
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state sovereignty, they have established a regime which is much less re-
spectful of state fiscal sovereignty than the U.S. one. In the United 
States, in fact, the emergence of the “golden rule” at the state level was 
not imposed by federal law, and the budgetary processes of the states 
and the federal government remain fully separated.210 On the contrary, 
EMU member states are obliged to adopt “golden rules” by the Fiscal 
Compact and forced to submit their budgetary procedures to pervasive 
supranational constraints.211 The Fiscal Compact’s adoption may there-
fore lead to the paradoxical situation of making fiscal policy manage-
ment in the EU supranational system much more centralized than in 
the U.S. federal one. This is ironic considering that EU member states 
have systematically discarded a federalist arrangement for the govern-
ance of the Euro-zone as being incompatible with state sovereignty. 
 The emergence and spread of the financial crisis during the last 
three years in Europe pushed a number of opinion-makers to call for a 
constitutional change in the architecture of the EMU.212 Many observ-
ers pointed specifically at the U.S. federal system as a model for the new 
EMU, arguing that the adoption of a federal arrangement in the EU 
context would improve the efficiency and legitimacy of the EU re-
sponse to the crisis.213 Yet, the governments of the EU member states 
have repeatedly discarded the option of moving the EU in the direction 
of a full-fledged federal system, seeing this step as incompatible with 
the preservation of state sovereignty.214 This position has been force-
fully defended, especially by France and Germany, who played a lead-
ing role in crafting the response to the Euro-crisis.215 Hence, in a public 
speech in Toulon on December 1, 2011, French President Sarkozy af-
firmed that the new architecture of the Euro-zone would be designed 
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to safeguard the full sovereignty of the EU member states.216 German 
Chancellor Merkel supported analogous arguments, perhaps under the 
noxious influence of the jurisprudence of the German Constitutional 
Court.217 Even though the German government apparently did not 
completely set aside the possibility that the institutional responses to 
the Euro-crisis could encompass greater political integration in the 
EU,218 the option of a federal arrangement for the EMU was discarded 
as an unacceptable form of “Transfer Union,” a system in which virtu-
ous Germany would have to give up its sovereignty to take care of the 
financial follies of other EU member states.219 
 The position of the member states’ governments fits comfortably 
within a general trend against federalism and constitutionalism in the 
EU, which, at least since the failure of the EU Constitutional Treaty in 
2005, seems to have gained the upper hand in European public dis-
course.220 Whereas the U.S. federal model loomed large in the minds 
of EU political elites at the beginning of the twenty-first century—the 
most prominent example being the speech by German Foreign Minis-
ter Fischer at Humboldt University in 2000,221 paving the way to the 
establishment of a Constitutional Convention on the Future of Eu-
rope222—a backlash seems to have occurred in the last few years.223 As 
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Renaud Dehousse has argued, an “anti-federalist” vision has recently 
prevailed, leading to a system in which state rights and national identity 
are at the center of the EU integration project.224 The Fiscal Compact, 
as the latest institutional response to the economic crisis by EU mem-
ber states, partakes of this “sovereigntist” narrative. As its sponsors un-
derline, the Fiscal Compact does not create a powerful central govern-
ment and leaves intact the fiscal sovereignty of the member states by 
introducing a mere coordination of their economic policies.225 Never-
theless, if one scratches the surface of this self-congratulating public 
narrative, a striking paradox emerges. The Fiscal Compact is bringing 
about centralization in the governance of the Euro-zone that is signifi-
cantly greater than that existing in the United States. 
 As previously explained, the Fiscal Compact has introduced a very 
detailed “golden rule” which member states are required to incorpo-
rate within their constitutions under the threat of judicial action before 
the ECJ. The “golden rule” significantly affects the relationship be-
tween executives, legislatures, and courts within the member states, 
and, if coupled with other recent normative developments in EU law, 
gives unprecedented powers to the European Commission to direct 
and police the budgetary policies of the EU countries.226 Nothing simi-
lar has ever happened in the United States; despite the progressive rise 
of the federal government in the economic and fiscal realm, the states 
decided in total independence to adopt balanced-budget amendments 
in their constitutions and are fully autonomous in the management of 
their budgetary processes.227 Indeed, in the United States, because of the 
federal system of government, it would arguably be impossible for the fed-
eral government to mandate to the states the incorporation of specific 
budgetary rules in the state constitutions and to require state legisla-
tures and governors to submit draft budgets for prior approval in Wash-
ington, DC.228 Yet, this is precisely what will happen in the EU as a re-
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sult of the Fiscal Compact.229 I do not intend to take a position here on 
whether this should be considered as a positive or negative develop-
ment. Rather, my purpose is to emphasize how this development is 
paradoxical given the commitment of the member states to design a 
new EMU architecture which would leave the sovereignty of the states 
wholly intact. As the comparative analysis shows, the legal response to 
the economic crisis embodied in the Fiscal Compact is bound to tip the 
EU balance of powers in favor of the supranational institutions, signifi-
cantly reducing the fiscal sovereignty and the budgetary autonomy of 
the member states. Therefore, while the federal model has repeatedly 
been considered inadequate for a “Europe of nation-states,”230 para-
doxically its embrace in the new architecture of the Euro-zone would 
have been not only more efficient to address the economic crisis, but 
also more protective of state autonomy and self-governance. 
Conclusion 
 This Article has analyzed the recently adopted Fiscal Compact by 
focusing on the requirement that signatory states incorporate a 
“golden rule” in their constitutions. The Fiscal Compact represents the 
latest attempt by the EU member states to address the financial crisis 
afflicting the Euro-zone by strengthening the fiscal discipline of the 
EMU. Yet, the obligation for the states to adopt the “golden rule” of the 
Fiscal Compact is an unprecedented development in the history of 
European integration. First, the Fiscal Compact designs an extremely 
detailed balanced-budget rule. Second, states are expressly obliged to 
incorporate the rule in their domestic systems through the highest 
domestic source of law, constitutional law. Third, the incorporation of 
the “golden rule” by the states is policed by powerful judicial mecha-
nisms, empowering the ECJ to sanction disobedient states with heavy 
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financial penalties. Fourth, respect of the “golden rule” is made a con-
dition to obtain financial assistance under the ESM. The Article has 
explained that the model of the Fiscal Compact can be traced in Ger-
man constitutional law, and has assessed the constitutional reforms in-
troducing budgetary constraints in Spain, Italy, and France. This se-
lected survey has revealed several divergences between the “golden 
rules” enacted at the state level and in the Fiscal Compact, but has un-
derlined how (with the exception of France) the largest EMU states 
consistently moved in the direction of tightening their budgetary 
commitments. 
 The purpose of the Article has been to examine the institutional 
implications of the enactment of the “golden rule,” both for state po-
litical and judicial branches, and for supranational institutions. While 
the effects of balanced-budget requirements on the relationships be-
tween executives and legislatures, and on the role of state Constitu-
tional Courts, are likely to vary from one state to another on the basis 
of several pre-existing governmental institutional features (such as the 
role of parliaments in the budgetary procedures) or on the system of 
constitutional review (such as the mechanisms by which review by Con-
stitutional Courts can be activated), the introduction of the “golden 
rule” systematically enhances the powers of the supranational institu-
tions. On the one hand, the Fiscal Compact entrusts to the ECJ new 
tasks to scrutinize and enforce budgetary rules within the states. On the 
other hand, the Fiscal Compact, coupled with other recent innovations 
in EU law, endows the European Commission—but critically, not the 
European Parliament—with new pervasive instruments to direct and 
oversee the fiscal policies of the states. These developments reveal an 
increasing centralization in the EU architecture of economic govern-
ance that contrasts with the federal experience of the United States. 
Although almost three-fourths of the U.S. states are endowed with 
“golden rules” in their state constitutions, the federal government 
never played a role in the adoption of these balanced-budget amend-
ments, and is barred from interfering with the budgetary processes of 
the states. 
 As the Article has argued, therefore, an unexpected paradox 
emerges. While EU member state governments have systematically dis-
carded calls in favor of a federal arrangement for the EMU as being dis-
respectful of state sovereignty, they have established a regime for Euro-
zone governance that sacrifices state sovereignty much more than would 
have been permitted in a federal system. A comparison with the United 
States sheds light on how intentions and outcome diametrically differed 
in the political responses to the Euro-crisis and reveals how, in the end, 
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the more EU member states attempt to avoid creating a federal architec-
ture for the EU, the more they end up fostering supranational centrali-
zation and reducing state autonomy. The name Fiscal Compact, by 
which the TSCG is usually referred, was suggested by European Central 
Bank President Mario Draghi in a speech before the European Parlia-
ment on December 1, 2011.231 The concept drew inspiration from Ham-
ilton’s statement that “the origin of all civil government, justly estab-
lished, must be a voluntary compact between the rulers and the 
ruled.”232 Hamilton was also one of the major architects of the U.S. sys-
tem, supporting the adoption of a complete constitutional framework 
and the creation of an effective federal government for the United 
States. It is perhaps time for the architects of EMU to rediscover the ide-
als of federalism and constitutionalism that Hamilton advocated. 
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